A Biophilosophical Approach to the Determination of Brain Death.

Technical and clinical developments have raised challenging questions about the concept and practice of brain death, culminating in recent calls for revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which established a whole brain standard for neurologic death. Proposed changes range from abandoning the concept of brain death altogether to suggesting that current clinical practice simply should be codified as the legal standard for determining death by neurologic criteria (even while acknowledging that significant functions of the whole brain might persist). We propose a middle ground, clarifying why whole brain death is a conceptually sound standard for declaring death, and offering procedural suggestions for increasing certainty that this standard has been met. Our approach recognizes that whole brain death is a functional, not merely anatomic, determination, and incorporates an understanding of the difficulties inherent in making empirical judgments in medicine. We conclude that whole brain death is the most defensible standard for determining neurologic death-philosophically, biologically, and socially-and ought to be maintained.

Knowledge gaps in heart and lung donation after the circulatory determination of death: Report of a workshop of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.

In a workshop sponsored by the U.S. National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, experts identified current knowledge gaps and research opportunities in the scientific, conceptual, and ethical understanding of organ donation after the circulatory determination of death and its technologies. To minimize organ injury from warm ischemia and produce better recipient outcomes, innovative techniques to perfuse and oxygenate organs postmortem in situ, such as thoracoabdominal normothermic regional perfusion, are being implemented in several medical centers in the US and elsewhere. These technologies have improved organ outcomes but have raised ethical and legal questions. Re-establishing donor circulation postmortem can be viewed as invalidating the condition of permanent cessation of circulation on which the earlier death determination was made and clamping arch vessels to exclude brain circulation can be viewed as inducing brain death. Alternatively, TA-NRP can be viewed as localized in-situ organ perfusion, not whole-body resuscitation, that does not invalidate death determination. Further scientific, conceptual, and ethical studies, such as those identified in this workshop, can inform and help resolve controversies raised by this practice.

Drugs, delirium, and ethics at the end of life.

For older persons with delirium at the end of life, treatment involves complex trade-offs and highly value-sensitive decisions. The principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice establish important parameters but lack the structure necessary to guide clinicians in the optimal management of these patients. We propose a set of ethical rules to guide therapeutics-the canons of therapy-as a toolset to help clinicians deliberate about the competing concerns involved in the management of older patients with delirium at the end of life. These canons are standards of judgment that reflect how many experienced clinicians already intuitively practice, but which are helpful to articulate and apply as basic building blocks for a relatively neglected but emerging ethics of therapy. The canons of therapy most pertinent to the care of patients with delirium at the end of life are as follows: (1) restoration, which counsels that the goal of all treatment is to restore the patient, as much as possible, to homeostatic equilibrium; (2) means-end proportionality, which holds that every treatment should be well-fitted to the intended goal or end; (3) discretion, which counsels that an awareness of the limits of medical knowledge and practice should guide all treatment decisions; and (4) parsimony, which maintains that only as much therapeutic force as is necessary should be used to achieve the therapeutic goal. Carefully weighed and applied, these canons of therapy may provide the ethical structure needed to help clinicians optimally navigate complex cases.

Addressing Challenges With Sedation in End-of-Life Care.

In 2009, Quill and colleagues stipulated that there are three types of sedation practices at the end of life: ordinary sedation, proportionate palliative sedation (PPS), and palliative sedation to unconsciousness (PSU). Of the three, PPS and PSU are described as "last-resort options" to relieve refractory symptoms, and PSU as the most ethically controversial type that "should be quite rare." Unfortunately, little is known about actual sedation practices at the end of life in the United States. This may be due in part to a lack of conceptual clarity about sedation in end-of-life care. We argue that, until more is known about what sedation practices occur at the end of life, and how practices can be improved by research and more specific guidelines, "palliative sedation" will remain more misunderstood and controversial than it might otherwise be. In our view, overcoming the challenges posed by sedation in end-of-life care requires: 1) greater specificity regarding clinical situations and approaches to sedation, 2) research tailored to focused clinical questions, and 3) improved training and safeguards in sedation practices. Terms like PPS and PSU are relatively simple to understand in the abstract, but their application comprises various clinical situations and approaches to sedation. An obvious barrier to empirical research on sedation practices in end-of-life care is the challenge of determining these elements, especially if not clearly communicated. Additionally, we argue that training for palliative care specialists and others should include monitoring and rescue techniques as required competencies.

Triage Procedures for Critical Care Resource Allocation During Scarcity.

Importance: During the COVID-19 pandemic, many US states issued or revised pandemic preparedness plans guiding allocation of critical care resources during crises. State plans vary in the factors used to triage patients and have faced criticism from advocacy groups due to the potential for discrimination. Objective: To analyze the role of comorbidities and long-term prognosis in state triage procedures. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study used data gathered from parallel internet searches for state-endorsed pandemic preparedness plans for the 50 US states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico (hereafter referred to as states), which were conducted between November 25, 2021, and June 16, 2023. Plans available on June 16, 2023, that provided step-by-step instructions for triaging critically ill patients were categorized for use of comorbidities and prognostication. Main Outcomes and Measures: Prevalence and contents of lists of comorbidities and their stated function in triage and instructions to predict duration of postdischarge survival. Results: Overall, 32 state-promulgated pandemic preparedness plans included triage procedures specific enough to guide triage in clinical practice. Twenty of these (63%) included lists of comorbidities that excluded (11 of 20 [55%]) or deprioritized (8 of 20 [40%]) patients during triage; one state's list was formulated to resolve ties between patients with equal triage scores. Most states with triage procedures (21 of 32 [66%]) considered predicted survival beyond hospital discharge. These states proposed different prognostic time horizons; 15 of 21 (71%) were numeric (ranging from 6 months to 5 years after hospital discharge), with the remaining 6 (29%) using descriptive terms, such as long-term. Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional study of state-promulgated critical care triage policies, most plans restricted access to scarce critical care resources for patients with listed comorbidities and/or for patients with less-than-average expected postdischarge survival. This analysis raises concerns about access to care during a public health crisis for populations with high burdens of chronic illness, such as individuals with disabilities and minoritized racial and ethnic groups.

Rethinking Brain Death-Why "Dead Enough" Is Not Good Enough: The UDDA Revision Series.

The emergence of cases of so-called "chronic brain death" seems to undermine the biophilosophical justification of brain death as true death, which was grounded in the idea that death entails the loss of integration of the organism. Severely neurologically damaged patients who can persist for years with proper support seem to be integrated organisms, and common sense suggests that they are not dead. We argue, however, that mere integration is not enough for an organism to be alive, but that living beings must be substantially self-integrating (i.e., a living organism must itself be the primary source of its integration and not an external agent such as a scientist or physician). We propose that irreversible apnea and unresponsiveness are necessary but not sufficient to judge that a human being has lost enough capacity for self-integration to be considered dead. To be declared dead, the patient must also irrevocably have lost either (1) cardiac function or (2) cerebrosomatic homeostatic control. Even if such bodies can be maintained with sufficient technological support, one may reasonably judge that the locus of integration effectively has passed from the patient to the treatment team. While organs and cells may be alive, one may justifiably declare that there is no longer a substantially autonomous, whole, living human organism. This biophilosophical conception of death implies that the notion of brain death remains viable, but that additional testing will be required to ensure that the individual is truly brain dead by virtue of having irrevocably lost not only the capacity for spontaneous respiration and conscious responsiveness but also the capacity for cerebrosomatic homeostatic control.

"They Would Lift My Spirits": Sources of Support for Family Surrogate Decision-Makers at the End of Life.

Surrogate decision-makers make critical decisions for loved ones at the end of life, and some experience lasting negative psychological outcomes. Understanding whom they rely on for support and the types of support they value may inform nursing care and that of other health team members who work with surrogates. The purpose of the study was to explore decision support and other types of support provided to surrogate decision-makers at the end of life of their loved one and perceived usefulness of the support. This secondary analysis of data from a mixed-methods study involved the examination of the transcripts of qualitative interviews with 13 surrogate decision-makers in the United States, conducted between 2010 and 2014. A constant comparative method was used to identify common themes surrounding surrogate decision support at the end of life. Surrogates valued advance directives and conversations with their loved one about treatment preferences. Surrogates described involving many different types of people in decision-making and other types of support. Finally, surrogates appreciated being reassured that they were doing a good job in making decisions and seemed to seek out this type of affirmation from various sources including the health care team, family, and friends. Nurses are well-positioned to provide this affirmation because of the time that they spend caring for the patient and family. Future research should further explore the concept of affirmation of surrogates in their role as a means of support as they make decisions for a loved one.

End-of-life practices: An ethical framework for clinicians.

Most hospitalized patients die following a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment and/or focus on comfort care. Since "Do not kill" is a general ethical norm, many healthcare professionals (HCPs) are uncertain or troubled by such decisions. We propose an ethical framework to help clinicians to understand better their own ethical perspectives about four end-of-life practices: lethal injections, the withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies, the withholding of life-sustaining therapies, and the injection of sedatives and/or analgesics for comfort care. This framework identifies three broad ethical perspectives that may permit HCPs to examine their own attitudes and intentions. According to moral perspective A (absolutist), it is never morally permissible to be causally involved in the occurrence of death. According to moral perspective B (agential), it may be morally permissible to be causally involved in the occurrence of death, if HCPs do not have the intention to terminate the patient's life and if, among other conditions, they ensure respect for the person. Three of the four end-of-life practices, but not lethal injection, may be morally permitted. According to moral perspective C (consequentialist), all four end-of-life practices may be morally permissible if, among other conditions, respect for persons is ensured, even if one intends to hasten the dying process. This structured ethical framework may help to mitigate moral distress among HCPs by helping them to understand better their own fundamental ethical perspectives, as well as those of their patients and colleagues.

Spirituality in Serious Illness and Health.

Importance: Despite growing evidence, the role of spirituality in serious illness and health has not been systematically assessed. Objective: To review evidence concerning spirituality in serious illness and health and to identify implications for patient care and health outcomes. Evidence Review: Searches of PubMed, PsycINFO, and Web of Science identified articles with evidence addressing spirituality in serious illness or health, published January 2000 to April 2022. Independent reviewers screened, summarized, and graded articles that met eligibility criteria. Eligible serious illness studies included 100 or more participants; were prospective cohort studies, cross-sectional descriptive studies, meta-analyses, or randomized clinical trials; and included validated spirituality measures. Eligible health outcome studies prospectively examined associations with spirituality as cohort studies, case-control studies, or meta-analyses with samples of at least 1000 or were randomized trials with samples of at least 100 and used validated spirituality measures. Applying Cochrane criteria, studies were graded as having low, moderate, serious, or critical risk of bias, and studies with serious and critical risk of bias were excluded. Multidisciplinary Delphi panels consisting of clinicians, public health personnel, researchers, health systems leaders, and medical ethicists qualitatively synthesized and assessed the evidence and offered implications for health care. Evidence-synthesis statements and implications were derived from panelists' qualitative input; panelists rated the former on a 9-point scale (from "inconclusive" to "strongest evidence") and ranked the latter by order of priority. Findings: Of 8946 articles identified, 371 articles met inclusion criteria for serious illness; of these, 76.9% had low to moderate risk of bias. The Delphi panel review yielded 8 evidence statements supported by evidence categorized as strong and proposed 3 top-ranked implications of this evidence for serious illness: (1) incorporate spiritual care into care for patients with serious illness; (2) incorporate spiritual care education into training of interdisciplinary teams caring for persons with serious illness; and (3) include specialty practitioners of spiritual care in care of patients with serious illness. Of 6485 health outcomes articles, 215 met inclusion criteria; of these, 66.0% had low to moderate risk of bias. The Delphi panel review yielded 8 evidence statements supported by evidence categorized as strong and proposed 3 top-ranked implications of this evidence for health outcomes: (1) incorporate patient-centered and evidence-based approaches regarding associations of spiritual community with improved patient and population health outcomes; (2) increase awareness among health professionals of evidence for protective health associations of spiritual community; and (3) recognize spirituality as a social factor associated with health in research, community assessments, and program implementation. Conclusions and Relevance: This systematic review, analysis, and process, based on highest-quality evidence available and expert consensus, provided suggested implications for addressing spirituality in serious illness and health outcomes as part of person-centered, value-sensitive care.

Rationing With Respect to Age During a Pandemic: A Comparative Analysis of State Pandemic Preparedness Plans.

BACKGROUND: Faced with possible shortages due to COVID-19, many states updated or rapidly developed crisis standards of care (CSCs) and other pandemic preparedness plans (PPPs) for rationing resources, particularly ventilators. RESEARCH QUESTION: How have US states incorporated the controversial standard of rationing by age and/or life-years into their pandemic preparedness plans? STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: This was an investigator-initiated, textual analysis conducted from April to June 2020, querying online resources and in-state contacts to identify PPPs published by each of the 50 states and for Washington, DC. Analysis included the most recent versions of CSC documents and official state PPPs containing triage guidance as of June 2020. Plans were categorized as rationing by (A) short-term survival (≤ 1 year), (B) 1 to 5 expected life-years, (C) total life-years, (D) "fair innings," that is, specific age cutoffs, or (O) other. The primary measure was any use of age and/or life-years. Plans were further categorized on the basis of whether age/life-years was a primary consideration. RESULTS: Thirty-five states promulgated PPPs addressing the rationing of critical care resources. Seven states considered short-term prognosis, seven considered whether a patient had 1 to 5 expected life-years, 13 rationed by total life-years, and one used the fair innings principle. Seven states provided only general ethical considerations. Seventeen of the 21 plans considering age/life-years made it a primary consideration. Several plans borrowed heavily from a few common sources, although use of terminology was inconsistent. Many documents were modified in light of controversy. INTERPRETATION: Guidance with respect to rationing by age and/or life-years varied widely. More than one-half of PPPs, many following a few common models, included age/life-years as an explicit rationing criterion; the majority of these made it a primary consideration. Terminology was often vague, and many plans evolved in response to pushback. These findings have ethical implications for the care of older adults and other vulnerable populations during a pandemic.

ICU Care in a Pandemic.

This letter to the editor responds to commentaries in the September-October 2021issue of the Hastings Center Report by Douglas B. White and Bernard Lo, by Govind Persad, and by Virginia A. Brown, which were themselves responding, in part, to the article "Life-Years and Rationing in the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Critical Analysis," by MaryKatherine Gaurke, Bernard Prusak, Kyeong Yun Jeong, Emily Scire, and Daniel P. Sulmasy.